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ABSTRACT
My thesis examines how the lack of board-of-director independence affects the structure and
disclosure of executive compensation. I find that European companies with more insiders on
their boards grant their executives more incentive compensation, after controlling for the level
and economic determinants of executive compensation. This effect is more pronounced in
countries with less protection for outside shareholders. The companies with more insiders on
their boards also disclose more transparent information about executive compensation. Overall,
my evidence supports the contracting hypothesis, in which capital market investors understand
potential detrimental effects of insiders and drive companies to mitigate these effects through
greater incentive compensation and improved compensation disclosure. The evidence is
inconsistent with the opportunism hypothesis, in which risk-averse insiders grant themselves
more fixed pay and disclose less transparent information about their compensation.
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I analyze the structure and disclosure of executive compensation in relation to the
dependence of boards on company executives. The analysis sheds light on a broader question:
Do companies lacking certain governance mechanisms, such as independent board monitoring,
respond by emphasizing alternative governance mechanisms, such as incentive compensation
and transparent disclosures about executive compensation? The proponents of independent
boards have long argued that top executives serving on company boards (hereafter, insiders)
exploit boards' authority and inflict real costs on their companies (Jensen, 1993). However,
whether companies' compensation policies are a protection against or an outcome of the
opportunistic behavior of insiders remains controversial, as articulated by two competing
hypotheses: the contracting hypothesis and the opportunism hypothesis.'
Under the contracting hypothesis, executive compensation minimizes agency costs
between top executives and shareholders. This hypothesis predicts that companies with
dependent boards use executive compensation to protect shareholders from the greater agency
costs in two ways.2 First, companies with dependent boards grant proportionately greater
incentive compensation to align interests of insiders with those of shareholders. Second,
companies with dependent boards disclose more transparent information about executive
compensation to assure shareholders that insiders do not receive non-optimal compensation.
In contrast, under the opportunism hypothesis, insiders capture the pay-setting process
at the expense of the shareholders. Assuming risk-averse and rational insiders, the opportunism
hypothesis predicts that insiders on dependent boards opportunistically set compensation
See Holmstrom (1979) and Datar et al. (2001) for theory, and Core et al. (2003) and Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) for a general discussion and empirical evidence on the contracting hypothesis. See Bebchuk et al. (2002)
for a general discussion and empirical evidence on the opportunism hypothesis.
2 I define dependent boards as boards in which insiders constitute a high proportion and/or company CEOs serve
as board chairs.
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policies in two ways. First, insiders on dependent boards grant themselves proportionately
smaller incentive compensation, since insiders are typically underdiversified and incentive
compensation is more risky than salaries. Second, insiders on dependent boards conceal their
opportunistic actions by disclosing less transparent information about executive compensation.
In this paper, I perform tests designed to discriminate between the contracting and
opportunism hypotheses, using hand-gathered data from the annual reports of the 158 largest
European companies for the years 1999 through 2001. The choice of European companies leads
to tests more powerful than those using U.S. companies, since European companies display a
greater variation in board structure, executive compensation, and compensation disclosure.
Furthermore, the choice of European companies enables me to examine the effect of alternative
governance mechanisms on the relation between board dependence and executive
compensation since many institutional characteristics vary significantly across countries in
Europe (La Porta et al., 1998; Bushman and Smith, 2003).
My tests focus on the proportion of incentive compensation rather than the level of
executive compensation, since the former more clearly discriminates between the contracting
and opportunism hypotheses. The contracting and opportunism hypotheses both predict greater
levels of executive compensation in companies with dependent boards. According to the
contracting hypothesis, companies with dependent boards grant greater incentive compensation
but thereby render executives less diversified. In return, executives demand and receive risk
premiums, which increase the levels of compensation (Core et al., 1999). According to the
opportunism hypothesis, insiders on dependent boards pay themselves more regardless of the
form of pay (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Consequently, I test the empirical validity of the
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contracting and opportunism hypotheses by examining the incentive-based proportion of
executive compensation, while controlling for the level of compensation.
I document three main findings. First, I find that companies with dependent boards
grant greater incentive compensation, after controlling for the level and economic determinants
of executive compensation. Second, companies with dependent boards grant even greater
incentive compensation in countries with fewer alternative governance mechanisms to protect
outside shareholders. Finally, companies with dependent boards also disclose more transparent
infiormation about executive compensation, after controlling for the effect of country-specific
regulations. My findings are robust to a battery of alternative test specifications, controlling for
sample selection bias and potential endogenous relations between incentive compensation,
level of compensation, and board dependence.
In sum, the evidence supports the contracting hypothesis, suggesting that companies
offset the opportunistic behavior of insiders through greater incentive compensation and
improved transparency of compensation disclosure. Also in line with the contracting
hypothesis, companies rely on incentive compensation more strongly when fewer alternative
governance mechanisms are available. On the other hand, my analyses show that the relation
between board dependence and executive compensation is nonlinear. Companies with boards
not dominated by insiders increase incentive compensation and improve compensation
disclosures in response to increasing insider influence, supporting the contracting argument.
However, companies with boards dominated by insiders (i.e., boards with a numerical majority
of insiders and with CEOs serving as board chairs) neither increase incentive compensation nor
improve compensation disclosures in response to increasing insider influence. Therefore, the
opportunism hypothesis cannot be rejected for companies with boards dominated by insiders.
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My findings suggest that the positive relation between board dependence and incentive
compensation to executives would be less pronounced-or even reversed-for U.S. companies,
which have CEO-dominated boards and several alternative mechanisms for outside shareholder
protection. Consistent with this prediction, the few empirical studies using U.S. companies
show that dependent boards result in less equity-based executive compensation (Mehran, 1995;
Ryan and Wiggins, 2004).
My findings also contribute to the literature on the economic implications of dependent
boards. Prior research mostly examines adverse effects of insiders and either implicitly or
explicitly recommends full board independence (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). An opposing
strand of literature recognizes operational benefits of insiders, such as superior information
flow and company decisions (Johnson et al., 1996). Regarding this debate, my findings suggest
that while companies cannot afford to wholly exclude insiders from their boards given the
operational benefits, they can alleviate related agency costs through the structure and disclosure
of executive compensation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
literature and develops two hypotheses about the effect of board independence on incentive
compensation and transparency of compensation disclosure, respectively. In Section 3, I
discuss the sample and define empirical variables. I document the relation between board
independence and incentive compensation in Section 4 and the relation between board




A board of directors is rarely fully independent of top management. A quarter of the
directors on the boards of the top European and U.S. companies also serve as company
executives (insiders).3 Moreover, a third of the board chairs in Europe and a majority of the
board chairs in the U.S. also serve as company CEOs (hereafter, CEO-Chairs). The extant
literature argues that insiders are among the root causes for ineffective board monitoring.
Specifically, insiders cannot effectively monitor themselves on behalf of shareholders.
Moreover, insiders impair the otherwise helpful contributions of independent directors (Jensen,
1993). Boards with CEO-Chairs are also less effective since board chairs are more influential in
setting board agendas than other directors (Yermack, 1996; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004).
Ineffective board monitoring results in real costs for companies. For instance,
companies with dependent boards pay their CEOs more for performance beyond CEOs' control
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), and record greater abnormal accruals (Klein, 2002). In
contrast, independent boards represent shareholder interests better in major company decisions
such as investments, CEO replacements, and takeovers (Del Guercio et al., 2003; Weisbach,
1988; Cotter et al., 1997; Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Consequently, capital markets favor
independent boards by reacting positively to the appointment of outside directors (Rosenstein
and Wyatt, 1990).
The preceding discussion focuses on the opportunistic behavior of insiders. However,
insiders also serve on boards for reasons of operational efficiency (Johnson et al., 1996;
B3rickley et al., 1997). For instance, insiders provide boards with company information superior
to that provided by outside directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Moreover, the presence of
3See Table 2 Panel A and Table 3 Panel A.
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insiders allows for greater discretion for top executives, which is ex-ante beneficial, especially
in highly uncertain business environments (Burkart et al., 1997). Therefore, companies do not
fully eliminate insiders despite the associated costs.
The question, then, is whether companies mitigate the adverse effects of insiders
through alternative governance mechanisms. The contracting and opportunism arguments make
opposite predictions for this question. The contracting argument predicts that various
governance mechanisms exist in equilibrium, and that if one mechanism is ineffective, then
alternative mechanisms are emphasized. This argument is similar in spirit to a number of
previous studies about the substitutability of alternative governance mechanisms: ownership
concentration versus legal protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1998); independent boards
versus the degree of shareholder orientation in company charter provisions (Gillan et al., 2003);
threat of employee termination versus pay-for-performance (Hallman et al., 2004); and product
market competition versus the level and structure of compensation (Hubbard and Palia, 1995).
The contracting argument implicitly requires that company managers and boards understand
the equilibrium between the alternative mechanisms, and that discipline from shareholders and
other stakeholders are powerful enough to prevent companies from opportunistically deviating
from this equilibrium. The opportunism argument, on the other hand, predicts that the
discipline from company shareholders and other stakeholders are not powerful enough to make
insiders implement additional mechanisms in response to an ineffective governance
mechanism.
In this paper, I examine two alternative governance mechanisms, incentive
compensation and compensation disclosure, in response to the increasing dependence of boards
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on executives. These two internal mechanisms are readily available to companies and introduce
few confounding effects when implemented.
2.1. Incentive compensation
Incentive compensation consists of bonuses and grants of company stock and options.
Incentive compensation links executive pay to company performance measures and thus aligns
interests of executives with those of shareholders (Core et al., 2003). Unlike alternative
mechanisms such as legal protection and takeovers, incentive compensation schemes are easy
to initiate and modify according to company needs (Porter, 1992; Perry and Zenner, 2001).
The contracting and opportunism hypotheses make conflicting predictions about the
relation between board independence and incentive compensation. The contracting hypothesis
predicts that companies with dependent boards prevent managerial abuse by emphasizing
incentive compensation. In contrast, the opportunism hypothesis predicts that risk-averse and
underdiversified insiders influence compensation committees to provide proportionately greater
salaries.
Most literature about executive compensation examines the level of compensation and
presents contradictory findings (Core et al., 2003). Lambert et al. (1993) predict, but fail to
document, that insiders exploit their companies through excessive compensation. Core et al.
(1999) find that CEOs are paid excessively under weak governance, but the level of CEO
compensation decreases with the proportion of insiders. Perry (2000) argues that CEO
compensation in the U.S. in the 1990s displays characteristics consistent with both the
contracting and opportunism hypotheses.
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The effect of board dependence on the structure of executive compensation is rarely
studied. In his descriptive paper, Mehran (1995) examines U.S. manufacturing firms in the
years 1979 and 1980, and finds that companies with dependent boards grant their executives
less equity-based compensation. Similarly, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) examine U.S. companies
in 1997 and find that companies with dependent boards grant their independent directors less
incentive compensation. Both papers support the opportunism hypothesis, suggesting that
insiders exploit their position on the boards to obtain less risky payments. Relative to these
papers, I use a recent and more diverse data set, control for the level of executive
compensation, and examine the effect of international institutional factors on this relation.
Hypothesis 1 states the prediction of the contracting hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Incentive compensation, defined as the ratio of the sum of bonus, stock,
and option grants to total compensation, is greater in companies with board chairs
serving as CEOs and in companies with a greater proportion of directors serving as
executives.
Alternative versions of the contracting and opportunism hypotheses provide
directionally opposite predictions from those in this paper. An alternative version of the
contracting hypothesis predicts that independent boards grant their executives more incentive
compensation to improve corporate governance. This prediction is similar in spirit to Hartzell
and Starks (2003), who document that institutional ownership in U.S. companies improves
monitoring of executives and also increases pay-for-performance. This version suggests that the
independent board reinforces alternative governance mechanisms when insiders' opportunistic
behavior is already constrained. In general, the contracting hypothesis implies that companies
attempt to maximize share value regardless of the board structure. Accordingly, I assume that
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the contracting hypothesis predicts greater use of incentive compensation schemes when such
schemes are most valuable, i.e., when insiders have the greatest influence on the boards.
Therefore, I rule out this version of the contracting hypothesis.
Similarly, an alternative version of the opportunism hypothesis claims that insiders with
superior company information award themselves stock-based grants instead of salaries of equal
value (Bebchuk et al., 2002). This choice is non-optimal for the opportunistic insiders. First,
executives are risk-averse. Given a level of compensation, they are better off with fixed
payments, which are less risky than incentive compensation (Hall and Murphy, 2000). Second,
salaries enable executives, whose wealth and human capital are disproportionately invested in
their companies, to diversify. Third, salaries provide greater flexibility than stock-based grants
of equal value even if executives use their salaries to purchase company stocks from the
market, since stock-based grants usually come with exercising and selling restrictions.
Therefore, I rule out this version of the opportunism hypothesis.
2.2. Transparency of compensation disclosure
Executives are likely to minimize compensation disclosure when compensation levels
are abnormally high and when company performance is poor (Aboody et al., 2004).
Shareholders of companies with dependent boards incur a greater risk of receiving poor
information about executive compensation for two reasons. First, insiders of dependent boards
are more influential in company disclosures. Second, independent directors, who can provide
information about executive compensation through alternative channels, are fewer in number.
The contracting and opportunism hypotheses make opposite predictions about the effect
of board dependence on compensation disclosure. The former predicts that companies with
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dependent boards disclose executive compensation more transparently to convince shareholders
that insiders are not transferring wealth to themselves. The latter predicts that insiders influence
boards to disclose executive compensation less transparently in order to hide the excessive and
non-optimal compensation they extract from their companies.
In a rare study on compensation disclosures, Coulton et al. (2001) find that transparency
of CEO compensation disclosure in Australia depends only upon company size and pay level.
Relative to their study, I use a larger and more diverse data set in terms of governance structure
and executive positions. Moreover, I define transparency of compensation disclosure more
broadly by focusing on the type, amount, and quality of the disclosures. Hypothesis 2 states the
prediction of the contracting hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Companies with board chairs serving as CEOs and companies with a
greater proportion of directors serving as executives make more transparent disclosures
about executive compensation.
The transparency of compensation disclosure is unlikely to be determined by board
dependence alone. Countries and stock exchanges impose varying disclosure regulations on
companies. Furthermore, compensation disclosure differs according to company-specific costs
and benefits shaped by industry, growth opportunities, and profitability. In addition, incentive
compensation improves compensation disclosure for two reasons. First, stock-based incentives
encourage executives to disclose overall company information in order to capture the
associated benefits (Nagar et al., 2003).4 Second, incentive compensation widens the range of
executive compensation levels (and is also positively correlated with the level of
4 Coulton et al. (2001) argue that compensation disclosure is the type of disclosure where the conflict of interest
between executives and shareholders is the greatest, regardless of the compensation structure. Hence, the
predictions of Nagar et al. (2003) are possibly the least applicable in this context.
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comapensation), which in turn attracts closer investor scrutiny and increases the risk of
litigation. Hence, companies that grant more incentive compensation avoid such costs by
promptly providing more transparent information about executive compensation. My empirical
tests control for the above country- and company-specific factors.
3. Sample selection
I gather data on executive compensation for the years 1999 through 2001 from the
annual reports of the 158 largest European companies, as given in the Forbes 2000 Global Top
800 list. I also use three databases to collect and cross-check financial information: the
Thomson Financial database, the Hoover's database, and the Compustat Global database.
Appendix 1 lists the companies in the sample and the average values of the major variables of
interest between years 1999 and 2001.
Table Panel A summarizes the sample selection. I exclude 46 companies with
insufficient compensation disclosure from the primary tests. Appendix 2 discusses disclosure
practices of the European companies, and specifies the disclosure criteria for inclusion in the
final data set. The final data set comprises three annual observations from each of the 112
companies with available information about executive compensation. Table 1 Panel B (Panel
C) displays the country (industry) breakdown of the final data set. Section 4.2 discusses the
selection bias.
Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the empirical variables in four
categories: board structure, executive compensation, compensation disclosure, and economic
determinants of executive compensation. Table 2 Panel B presents correlations among selected
variables. My tests use compensation information for top executives, the number of whom is
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denoted by N Executive. The median of NExecutive is 5. The companies have four types of
compensation (with medians in parentheses): salary (633,000), bonuses (C213,000), stock
grants (0), and option grants (228,000). Bonuses comprise variable cash payments related to
short and long-term incentive plans. Stock and option grants are the values of grants
unconditionally allotted to executives. The value of stock grants is the number of shares
granted times the annual average stock price. Option grants are valued by the Black-Scholes
model, the parameters of which are obtained from company annual reports and the DataStream
database. For missing parameters, I use default values comparable to the values of the
disclosing companies and U.S. companies. 5 Overall, a top European executive earns £1.4
million a year and holds company stocks and options worth C0.1 million and C0.5 million,
respectively.
Table 2 Panel C displays averages of selected variables according to country. Table 2
Panel D displays country-specific institutional characteristics identified by previous research.
For comparison purposes, Table 3 Panels A and B respectively exhibit descriptive statistics for
the top 150 U.S. companies over the same period and for the 46 European companies excluded
due to insufficient disclosure. Consistent with the evidence in Bebchuk et al. (2002), a top U.S.
executive earns more, C5.3 million, and holds a greater value of company stocks and options,
worth £11.1 million and C6.3 million respectively. Below I define the empirical variables.
3.1. Board dependence (Proxies: InsiderRatio and CEO-Chair)
The proxies for board dependence are InsiderRatio (the ratio of the number of directors
serving as company executives to total number of directors) and CEO-Chair (a dummy variable
5 Section 4.4. provides sensitivity checks on the default values.
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equal to 1 if the board chair also serves as the company CEO and 0 otherwise). Alternative
proxies such as executive tenure and affiliated directors are not used, since they are either
unavailable or loosely defined even in the U.S. (NYSE Corporate Governance Guidelines,
2002).
InsiderRatio in Europe has a mean of 0.25 and a median of 0.20. It is above 0.50 for 49
observations and 0 for 90 observations. Meanwhile, InsiderRatio in the U.S. has a mean of
0.24, similar to that in Europe, but displays lower volatility in the cross-section (Perry, 1999).
CEO-Chair in Europe has a mean of 0.31, whereas CEO-Chair in the U.S. is significantly
greater with a mean of 0.81.
3.2. Incentive compensation (Proxy.: IncentivePay)
The conventional pay-for-performance definition is "the change in the dollar value of
the CEO's stock and options for a 1% or $1 change in stock price" (Core and Guay, 1999). The
information about option and stock award dates and stock prices is limited for many companies
in my data set. Therefore, following the literature, I define IncentivePay as the ratio of the sum
of bonus, stock, and option grants to total compensation (Mehran, 1995; Core et al., 1999).
European companies, with a median IncentivePay of 0.52, grant less incentive compensation
than U.S. companies, with a median IncentivePay of 0.83.
3.3. Transparency of compensation disclosure (Proxy.: Disclosure)
Annual reports serve as the most comprehensive source of information about executive
compensation. I observe that alternative company disclosures such as survey participations and
news statements provide negligible incremental information. This observation is in line with
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Lang and Lundholm (1993), who document a positive correlation between annual report
disclosures and other types of company disclosures. The proxy Disclosure measures the
transparency of compensation disclosure in company annual reports. Disclosure incorporates
three measures: type, quality, and amount of executive compensation disclosure.
Type of Compensation Disclosure. A company receives 1 point each if it explicitly
discloses salary and bonus (SalaryDisclosure) and stock and option (StockDisclosure)
compensation. If the company does not grant any incentive compensation, an explicit statement
of this policy warrants the full 2 points for StockDisclosure.
Amount of Compensation Disclosure. AmountDisclosure measures the number of
disclosed compensation contracts. Companies that merely disclose either average executive pay
or the compensation contract of only one executive receive no points; those that disclose two
contracts receive 1 point; and those that disclose more than two receive 2 points.
Quality of Compensation Disclosure. QualityDisclosure measures the extent to which a
company reveals the following information: (i) overall compensation policy and goals, (ii) pay-
setting guidelines for specific positions, (iii) executive compensation in previous years, and (iv)
future determinants of executive compensation. Companies that disclose none of the above
items receive no points; those that disclose some receive 1 point; and those that disclose all
items receive 2 points.
Disclosure sums the measures SalaryDisclosure, StockDisclosure, AmountDisclosure,
and QualityDisclosure. Disclosure takes values between 0 and 6. Note that salary, bonus, stock,
and option payments for all 112 companies in the final data set are available and that the above
disclosure measures specify the extent to which companies release information about their
executive compensation. For example, a StockDisclosure of 0 in the final data set would imply
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that the company did not disclose any information about its stock grants in that year, but that
this information became available in subsequent years. The mean Disclosure for the 112
disclosing companies is 4.62 and that for the 46 non-disclosing companies is 1.62. The
difference is statistically significant. Also, Table 2 Panel C shows that Disclosure exhibits
considerable variation across countries, the U.K. being most transparent with a score of 5.81
and Italy the least transparent with a score of 1.54.
I conduct a number of analyses to assess the empirical validity of Disclosure. I start by
examining the components of Disclosure. The disclosure strategies-in this paper, the type,
amount, and quality of compensation disclosure-are expected to be coordinated in a company
(Botosan, 1997). Thus, I expect positive correlations among the four components of Disclosure
(i.e., SalaryDisclosure, StockDisclosure, AmountDisclosure, and QualityDisclosure). I find that
all correlation coefficients among the components are significant and positive. I also compute
Cronbach's coefficient alpha, a widely used reliability statistic for latent variables. Coefficient
alpha takes values between 0 and 1; the greater the alpha, the more likely that components
contribute to a reliable latent variable. The cutoff alpha for an acceptable latent variable, though
varying across disciplines, is suggested as 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978). The Cronbach's coefficient
alpha for the components of Disclosure is 0.73. Moreover, dropping a component from
Disclosure does not increase the coefficient alpha, which suggests that all components
contribute to a reliable Disclosure proxy. Using the components of Disclosure, I also conduct a
factor analysis, which leads to a single factor explaining 46% of the overall component
variation. This factor and Disclosure are almost perfectly correlated (a coefficient of 0.99). The
untabulated tests using this factor instead of Disclosure generate similar results to those
reported in Section 5.
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In my second set of analyses, I examine whether Disclosure is associated with company
characteristics shown in the literature to be correlated with the general company disclosure.
Employing meta-analysis of 29 previous studies, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) identify three
factors that are significantly correlated with company disclosure: corporate size, listing status,
and leverage. I find that Disclosure is positively correlated with the number of listings.
However, Disclosure is not positively correlated with measures of company size and leverage. I
exercise caution in interpreting the results, since Disclosure focuses on only one aspect of
company disclosure (executive compensation), and not on the general level of company
disclosure. Moreover, my data set is comprised of the largest European companies, which do
not exhibit universal variability in company financials such as size and leverage. In a separate
set of tests, I find that Disclosure is positively correlated with the institutional factors of
shareholder protection, described in Section 3.5. I conclude that Disclosure is a valid proxy for
the transparency of compensation disclosure.
3.4. Economic determinants of executive compensation and disclosure
Stock-based Holdings. Executives hold company stocks and options that were granted
or purchased in previous years. I define IncentiveHeld for each company as the ratio of the
average value of stock and option holdings to total annual executive compensation. Stock and
option holdings; already provide significant incentives to executives (Yermack, 1995; Core et
al., 2003). Therefore, I predict that IncentivePay will be lower when IncentiveHeld is higher.
Level of Compensation. Log(TotalPay) is the natural logarithm of the average executive
compensation of a company. I control for the level of compensation in order to draw clear
inferences on the relation between board dependence and compensation structures. Executives
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demand high levels of compensation to offset the incremental risk they incur related to
incentive-based compensation (Core et al., 1999). Therefore, I predict a positive relation
between IncentivePay and Log(TotalPay).
Company Size: The extant literature predicts that incentive compensation increases with
company size (Core et al., 2003). I also expect the transparency of compensation disclosure to
increase with company size. Log(TotalAssets), Log(Sales), Log(MCap), and number of
employees, NEmployee, are proxies for company size.
Company Performance. Company performance increases incentive compensation either
because the value of stock-based grants increases with performance or because companies grant
greater incentive compensation to reward performance. I also expect transparency of
compensation disclosure to increase with performance. The related proxies are annual stock
return (StockReturn), net income deflated by total assets (NetIncome), and operating profit
deflated by total assets (OpProfit).
Working, Capital. Companies with high working capital have more funds readily
available for managerial misuse. I expect higher agency costs and incentive compensation for
these companies. WorkingCap is defined as the working capital deflated by total assets.
Operational Complexity. Companies with complex operations have higher agency costs
and greater incentive compensation (Bushman et al., 2004). I use two proxies for operational
complexity. DiverseOperations is the average of the sales dispersions in product type and
location. Sales dispersions for each company are computed as one minus the sum of the squares
of the sales fractions in product type and location. DiverseOperations ranges from 0 to 1, a
higher value indicating more dispersed sales. VariableProfit is the coefficient of variation of a
company's operating profit, i.e., the standard deviation of a company's operating profit divided
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by its time-series mean. I expect incentive compensation to increase with operational
complexity.
Growth Opportunities. Optimal managerial actions are not well defined and agency
costs are higher in companies with growth opportunities (Morgan and Poulsen, 2001).
Following Core and Guay (2001) and Nagar (2002), I expect to find higher incentive
compensation and transparency of compensation disclosure in companies with growth
opportunities. The proxies for growth opportunities are market-to-book ratio (M/B), research
and development costs deflated by total assets (R&D), and capital expenditures deflated by
total assets (CAPX).
Managerial Position: Low-level executives, on average, receive proportionately lower
incentive compensation than top executives (Core et al., 2003). Therefore, I expect to find a
lower proportion of incentive compensation as NExecutive, the number of executives whose
contracts are used to compute company averages, increases.
Board Size. Small boards are more effective in monitoring executives and creating
value (Yermack, 1996). Therefore, I expect to find lower incentive compensation and less
transparent compensation disclosure in companies with a lower number of total directors,
N_ Director.
Cross-Listings. I expect to find higher transparency of compensation disclosure in
companies whose shares are listed in a greater number of stock exchanges, denoted by
N Listed (Khanna et al., 2004).
Industry.: The incentive-based proportion of executive compensation varies across
industries (Core et al., 2003). Table 1 identifies nine major industry groups used in the tests.
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Year. Many code law companies, traditionally far from common law practices, have
recently initiated incentive compensation schemes in response to growing equity culture,
securities reforms, and competition in the market for executives (Ferrarini et al., 2003).
Therefore, I expect that incentive compensation is more prevalent in 2001 than in 1999.
3.5. International institutionalfactors
I also capitalize on the international setting of my data set to examine how institutional
factors influence the effect of board dependence on executive compensation. Leuz et al. (2003)
group countries into three distinct clusters according to their institutional characteristics: i)
"outsider economies" with large stock markets, low ownership concentration, high disclosure,
extensive outsider rights, and strong legal enforcement (e.g., the U.K.); ii) "insider economies"
with small stock markets, high ownership concentration, low company disclosure, but strong
law enforcement (e.g., Germany); and, iii) "insider economies" with weak law enforcement
(e.g., Italy). The authors find that outside shareholders are protected more strongly in outsider
economies than in insider economies, and more in insider economies with strong law
enforcement than in those with weak law enforcement.
The contracting and opportunism hypotheses both predict weaker, but still directionally
opposite, relations between board dependence and incentive compensation in outsider
economies versus insider economies (and similarly in insider economies with strong law
enforcement versus those with weak law enforcement), but for different reasons. The
contracting hypothesis predicts that strong investor protection through alternative mechanisms
reduces the need for incentive compensation. Therefore, the positive relation between board
dependence and incentive compensation should be less pronounced in outsider economies. On
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the other hand, the opportunism hypothesis predicts that the strong investor protection prevents
insiders from paying themselves proportionately more in salaries. Therefore, the negative
relation between board dependence and incentive compensation should be less pronounced in
outsider economies.
I use the following institutional factors identified in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and
Leuz et al. (2003). Common Law is a dummy variable that indicates a common law country.
The U.K. is the only common law country in the data set. Legal Enforcement is a composite
measure based on the following variables: (1) efficiency of the judicial system, (2) investors'
assessment of the rule of law, and (3) pervasiveness of corruption. Importance of Equity Market
is a composite measure based on the following variables: (1) aggregate stock market
capitalization held by minority shareholders relative to gross national product, (2) number of
listed domestic firms relative to population, and (3) number of IPOs relative to population.
Outside Investor Rights is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights. Country
Disclosure is an average measure of the extent of information disclosure in company reports for
each country. Additionally, using my data set, I define an ownership concentration measure,
Block, which is the sum of the percentage of shares owned by the three largest shareholders of a
company. Block is available for 156 companies. Table 2 Panel D presents statistics on the
above factors across countries.
4. Empirical results: board dependence and incentive compensation
Models 1 to 5 in Table 4 report results of the OLS regressions of IncentivePay on
different sets of explanatory variables, i.e., board dependence variables, control variables, and
industry, year, and country fixed effects. Overall, the results support the contracting hypothesis.
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The coefficient on InsiderRatio is significantly positive in all models. According to model 5,
the ratio of incentive compensation is higher by 0.018 when an executive is on the board of 9
independent directors. The coefficient on CEO-Chair is also positive, but loses its significance
when country fixed effects are included. InsiderRatio and CEO-Chair increase the goodness-
of-fit from an adjusted R2 of 35.2% in model 4 to 36.4% in model 5. Moreover, an untabulated
regression with an interaction term between InsiderRatio and CEO-Chair results in a negative
coefficient for the interaction term, suggesting that CEO-Chairs and other insiders reduce each
other's marginal effect on incentive compensation.
The coefficients on the level of compensation are significant and consistent with the
predictions. However, the coefficients on stock-based holdings, company performance,
working capital, operational complexity, growth opportunities, managerial position, and board
size are insignificant, though consistent in sign with the predictions.
The OLS regressions in models 1 to 5 treat the level of executive compensation as an
exogenous variable. However, if the structure and the level of executive compensation are
simultaneously determined, the results suffer from the endogeneity bias. For instance, insiders
may not be able to draw excessive salaries due to close investor scrutiny, internal restrictions,
and unfavorable accounting and tax treatments; hence they may opportunistically choose to pay
themselves in the form of excessive stock grants. This argument would predict higher
proportions of incentive compensation and greater levels of compensation for companies with
dependent boards and thus would bias the OLS coefficients of the above models. I find little
evidence supporting this explanation. Table 2 Panel B shows that board dependence is
positively correlated with the proportion of incentive compensation, but not with the level of
compensation. also run a 2SLS regression in model 6, using company size and average
26
compensation levels of a company's industry and country as instruments for the level of
compensation. The coefficients on board dependence and level of compensation remain
positive. I conclude that the positive relation between board dependence and incentive
compensation is not driven by the potential endogeneity between incentive compensation and
the level of compensation.
4. 1. Insider dominance on the boards
I then examine how the extent of insider dominance affects the relation between board
dependence and incentive compensation. Specifically, I inquire whether the contracting
hypothesis, valid for the whole sample, holds for companies with insider dominance.
According to the opportunism hypothesis, boards with the most influential insiders will be the
least likely to make decisions against insiders' preferences. Table 5 divides the data set into
four independent groups using two measures of insider dominance. The first measure is the
numerical majority of insiders on boards, given arguments that boards are independent only
when independent directors compose a numerical majority (Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002).
The second measure is the presence of a CEO-Chair. Observations are not equally distributed
across the groups: There are 200 firm-year observations with neither an insider majority nor a
CEO-Chair, whereas there are only 16 firm-year observations with both an insider majority and
a CEO-Chair.
The regression results show that companies with an insider majority and a CEO-Chair
do not increase, but rather reduce, the proportion of incentive compensation in response to the
effect of insiders. In contrast, the proportion of incentive compensation increases with the
proportion of insiders for the companies in other groups. The results suggest that the
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contracting hypothesis is valid for the sample as a whole but the opportunism hypothesis cannot
be ruled out for companies under intense insider influence.
4.2. Sample selection bias
The above models exclude 46 out of 158 companies examined due to their insufficient
disclosure about executive compensation. The non-disclosing companies mostly originate from
Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy, where compensation disclosures were not mandatory
between 1999 and 2001. Table 3 Panel B shows that non-disclosing companies do not
significantly differ from the disclosing companies in size and market valuation. Coming from
code law countries, they have fewer insiders and more blockholding shareholders. My results
suffer from sample selection bias if insiders in the non-disclosing companies opportunistically
pay themselves proportionately less incentive compensation, and conceal this practice.
While executive compensation of the non-disclosing companies is ultimately unknown,
I search for selection bias by assuming different possibilities about the compensation practices
of the non-disclosing companies. Table 6 reports the results of this analysis. For comparison
purposes, models 1 and 2 present the regression results for the disclosing companies. Models 3
to 6 present the regression results for both the disclosing and non-disclosing companies.
One possible explanation for why companies do not disclose executive compensation is
that these companies simply do not grant any incentive compensation. This explanation is
reasonable. I observe that some companies start disclosing more transparent compensation
information in the year they initiate incentive compensation schemes. Accordingly, model 3
assumes that the non-disclosing companies do not grant any incentive compensation (i.e.,
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IncentivePay for each non-disclosing company is 0). The relation between the extent of board
dependence and incentive compensation is stronger under this assumption.
Another possible explanation for why companies do not disclose executive
compensation is that companies grant incentive compensation but that costs of voluntary
disclosures exceed benefits. Accordingly, models 4 and 5 assume that each non-disclosing
company pays its executives the same amount and proportion of incentive pay as an average
company in its industry and country. The positive relation between board dependence and
incentive compensation holds in both models. This finding suggests that if the non-disclosing
companies follow the compensation practices of their country and industry, the selection bias
does not confound the findings of Table 4.
Finally, model 6 explores the possibility that executive compensation for non-disclosing
companies is fully incentive-based (i.e., IncentivePay for each non-disclosing company is 1).
This possibility is remote (Ferrarini et al., 2003). This assumption works against finding a
positive relation between InsiderRatio and IncentivePay, because the non-disclosing companies
have fewer insiders than the disclosing companies. The regression result shows that the
goodness-of-fit drops drastically from an adjusted R2 of 11.6% in model 1 to 3.0%. The
coefficient on InsiderRatio also becomes insignificant, while the coefficient on CEO-Chair
becomes 0.06, significant though lower than that in model 1.
I conclude that selection bias does not critically confound the relation between board
dependence and incentive compensation. My conclusion is especially sound if i) the non-
disclosing companies follow the compensation practices of their country and industry, or ii) net
costs of compensation disclosures for the non-disclosing companies do not increase with
incentive compensation, contrary to the case in disclosing companies.
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4.3. The role of international institutionalfactors
The international scope of my paper enables me to examine the effect of alternative
governance mechanisms on the relation between board dependence and incentive
compensation. Table 7 reports results of OLS regressions of IncentivePay on international
institutional factors, interaction terms between the factors and InsiderRatio, and other
determinants of executive compensation. The coefficients on the institutional factors of the
outsider economies (i.e., Common Law, Importance of Equity Market, Outside Investor Rights,
and Country Disclosure) are positive, whereas the coefficients on the interaction terms are
negative. In contrast, the coefficient on Block is negative and the coefficient on the interaction
term is positive.
I interpret the findings as follows: companies of outsider economies, where outside
shareholder protection is higher, inherently grant greater incentive compensation to their
executives than companies of insider economies do. However, companies of outsider
economies do not use incentive compensation as extensively to protect against the adverse
effects of insiders, possibly because of the presence of alternative control mechanisms. In
contrast, companies of insider economies, which are characterized by code law origin and
concentrated ownership, grant lower incentive compensation but use incentive compensation in
response to insiders more extensively, possibly because of the lack of alternative mechanisms.
4. 4. Alternative explanations and sensitivity checks
Endogeneity between Incentive Compensation and Board Dependence
The regression models in Table 4 follow the literature in treating board dependence
variables as exogenous (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The
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underlying assumption is that board characteristics are determined before executive
compensation is set and do not systematically change with executive compensation. However,
if executive compensation influences board characteristics, then my results suffer from the
endogeneity bias. For instance, ongoing incentive compensation may increase insiders' stake in
their companies and make insiders more influential on company boards. I address this caveat
with two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, using a company's German, English, French,
or Scandinavian origin as instruments for the board dependence variables (La Porta et al.,
1998). Table 2 Panels C and D favor the choice of instruments. Companies of the same legal
origin have similar board structures. For instance, companies of German and Scandinavian
origin have few insiders, while companies of English origin have the highest ratio of insiders.
At the same time, companies of the same legal origin have diverse compensation practices.
Furthermore, unreported first-stage regressions of InsiderRatio and CEO-Chair on company
legal origins result in high goodness-of-fit and significant coefficients.
The unreported 2SLS estimation results in positive coefficients for the board
dependence variables. In an alternative 2SLS estimation, I use the presence of two-tier boards
as man instrument for board dependence. Two-tier structures are mandated by many code law
countries and may better proxy for board dependence than the legal origin variables above.
Unreported regression results again show positive coefficients on board dependence variables.
Censored Dependent Variable
IncentivePay is a censored dependent variable ranging from 0 to 1, and ideally requires
a Tobit regression. With few observations at the end-points (eleven observations at 0, and a
single observation at 1), Tobit regression is not expected to significantly add to the explanatory
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power of the OLS regressions (Greene, 2000). Unreported results for interval-censored Tobit
regressions are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4.
Black-Scholes Parameters
Company annual reports and the DataStream database fail to report Black-Scholes
parameters for 90% of the data set. For missing parameters, I use default values of 4.7% as the
risk-free rate, 30% as the stock volatility, 2% as the dividend yield, and 70% of the vesting
period as the time-to-expiration. The default values are similar to parameters of the disclosing
companies and U.S. averages from the ExecuComp database. Unreported sensitivity checks
show that regression coefficients fluctuate by less than 10% in response to ±40% changes on
the default values. I conclude that empirical results are not driven by the choice of default
values.
Alternative Proxies
The empirical results do not materially change when bonus grants are excluded from
IncentivePay, or when primary proxies of the economic determinants of incentive
compensation are replaced by their alternative proxies defined in Section 3.4.
For analyses across international companies, Wysocki (2004) recommends that
empirical variables be deflated by total sales, instead of total assets, due to the cross-country
variation in asset recognition rules. The results of the empirical tests with total sales as the
deflator are qualitatively the same.
5. Empirical results: board dependence and compensation disclosure
Table 8 reports results of two Tobit models using Disclosure as the dependent variable.
Model 1, which includes all 158 companies examined, uses board dependence variables and
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other economic determinants of disclosure as the explanatory variables. Model 2 excludes the
46 non-disclosing companies and adds IncentivePay and Log(TotalPay) to the explanatory
variables of model 1. Models 1 and 2 are run under three sets of regressions. Set 1 does not
include any fixed effects. Set 2 includes industry, year, and country fixed effects. Set 3
excludes board dependence variables to examine the incremental power of the board
dependence variables in explaining the transparency of compensation disclosure.
The regression results support the contracting hypothesis. The proportion of insiders on
company boards is the main determinant of the transparency of compensation disclosure. The
coefficient on InsiderRatio is significant but lower for set 2, which uses industry, year, and
country fixed effects. This finding suggests that companies in the same country tailor their
compensation disclosures according to the extent of insiders on their boards. The findings also
show that transparency of compensation disclosure improves with the level of executive
compensation and the ratio of incentive compensation. The coefficients on the other control
variables usually have the predicted signs, but are not consistent across models.
5.1. Insider dominance on the boards
I then examine how the extent of insider dominance affects the relation between board
dependence and the transparency of compensation disclosure. Specifically, I inquire whether
the contracting hypothesis, valid for the whole sample, holds for companies with insider-
dominated boards. According to the opportunism hypothesis, boards dominated by insiders will
be the most reluctant to disclose non-optimal executive compensation. As in Section 4.1., I
divide the data set into four independent groups using two measures of insider dominance: the
numerical majority of insiders on boards and the presence of a CEO-Chair. Unreported Tobit
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results show that the positive relation between the extent of board dependence and transparency
of compensation disclosure is significant in all company groups except the one with insider
majorities on boards and CEO-Chairs. As in the case for incentive compensation, I conclude
that the contracting hypothesis holds for the whole data set, but that opportunism hypothesis
camnnot be ruled out for companies under intense insider influence.
5.2. The role of international institutionalfactors
I also examine the effect of alternative governance mechanisms on the transparency of
compensation disclosure. Table 9 reports results of Tobit regressions of Disclosure on
international institutional factors and other determinants of compensation disclosure. The
institutional factors of outsider economies as well as Legal Enforcement are positively
correlated with the transparency of compensation disclosure. In contrast, Block, which is
related to insider economies, is negatively correlated with the transparency of compensation
disclosure. The findings suggest that companies of outsider economies disclose executive
compensation more transparently, whereas institutional investors in insider economies create or
invest in companies disclosing less transparent information about compensation.
Unreported Tobit regressions, which include interaction terms between institutional
factors and InsiderRatio, result in insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms. This
finding suggests that alternative control mechanisms influence the transparency of
compensation disclosure, but do not significantly affect the positive relation between board
dependence and the transparency of compensation disclosure.
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5.3. Sensitivity Checks and Alternative Explanations
Model Specification
Tobit regressions treating Disclosure as a cardinal variable may result in spurious
coefficients, since Disclosure is constructed as an ordinal variable. I address this caveat by
using two separate checks. First, non-parametric Spearman and Kendall tests yield a significant
positive correlation between InsiderRatio and Disclosure. Second, decile rank regressions again
yield significantly positive coefficients on InsiderRatio. I conclude that the positive relations
between board dependence and transparency of compensation disclosure in Tables 8 and 9 are
not spuriously driven by the choice of the Tobit regression.
In another set of tests, I control for the self-selection bias by using the Heckman
procedure. I divide Disclosure into two components. The first component indicates the decision
to disclose, measured by SalaryDisclosure and StockDisclosure. The second component is the
extent of disclosure, measured by AmountDisclosure and QualityDisclosure. The unreported
Heckman tests show that the proportion of insiders is influential in both the decision to disclose
and the transparency of compensation disclosure.
Correlated omitted variables
I run a Tobit regression with company fixed effects to filter out the effect of correlated
variables, which may be omitted by the Tobit models in Table 8. Unreported results show that
both InsiderRatio and IncentivePay continue to be the predominant explanatory variables for
the transparency of compensation disclosure. I conclude that the empirical positive relation
between board dependence and the transparency of compensation disclosure is unlikely to
result from omitted company-specific factors.
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Alternative Proxies
Unreported test results are insensitive to the alternative proxies of the economic
determinants of disclosure defined in Section 3.4. Deflation of the empirical variables by total
sales instead of total assets, as suggested by Wysocki (2004), also does not materially change
the test results. In addition, when NListed is replaced by USListed, the proxy for listing in U.S.
markets, the coefficient on USListed is positive and significant. This finding supports the
argument that the total number of listings and being listed in the U.S. both increase
transparency of compensation disclosure.
6. Summary and conclusions
I provide international evidence concerning the effect of dependent boards on executive
compensation and the related disclosures. My motivation for this study is twofold. First, I
attempt to shed light on the controversy in the literature over whether companies can adopt in-
house measures against governance inefficiencies. Second, I examine the effect of international
institutional factors on the relation between board independence and executive compensation.
To this end, I hand-collect official compensation data across European companies with varying
institutional factors, including the structure and disclosure of executive compensation. This
method, to my knowledge, is rare in international governance studies, which mostly rely on
survey results and country averages (Conyon and Schwalbach, 1999).
My findings show that companies with more dependent boards (i.e., companies with
more insiders on their boards and companies with CEOs serving as board chairs) grant their
executives greater incentive compensation, after controlling for the level of compensation and
other determinants of incentive compensation. Moreover, companies with more dependent
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boards disclose more transparent information about executive compensation. The overall
evidence is consistent with the contracting hypothesis, indicating that companies either adopt or
reinforce alternative governance mechanisms when they lack an important one (independent
board monitoring).
However, the effect of dependent boards on incentive compensation is not uniform
across observations. Board dependence results in a greater proportion of incentive
compensation only when insiders do not dominate the boards (i.e., when insiders do not form a
numerical majority on the board or when the CEO does not serve as the board chair.)
Furthermore, the effect of board dependence on incentive compensation is more pronounced
when alternative mechanisms for outside shareholder protection do not exist or are less
effective, as in insider economies versus outsider economies.
The sensitivity analyses above provide a general picture of the substitutability of
alternative governance mechanisms in an international setting. By induction, these analyses
imply that the positive relation between board dependence and incentive compensation would
at least be less pronounced for U.S. companies, where insiders are more influential on boards
and several alternative mechanisms for outside shareholder protection exist. The few empirical
studies using U.S. companies support this prediction: dependent boards in the U.S. result in less
incentive compensation, not only for executives (Mehran, 1995) but also for independent board
directors (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004).
My results indicate that companies, on average, take actions to offset governance
inefficiencies. However, my results do not necessarily imply that these actions fully address the
governance inefficiencies or that the recent regulatory trend promoting board independence and
more transparent disclosures is redundant. As one example of such regulatory changes, the
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European Commission is moving towards mandating more transparent disclosures of executive
compensation (Karp and Wallmeyer, 2004). An interesting future study in this context might
compare characteristics of companies that voluntarily resort to more transparent disclosures
versus those that change their disclosures as a result of regulatory requirements. I believe that
the ever-increasing trend toward more transparent disclosures will reveal more about such
dynamics of corporate governance, and make possible promising studies that require less
concern for the types of empirical caveats stated in this paper.
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Table 1 Panel A - Sample selection
Companies
Initial sample from the 'Forbes 2000 Top
800 International Companies' list
Less: Repetitions of companies with double
headquarters
Less: Regulatory institutions
Less: Mergers after year 2000
Less: Bankruptcies after year 2000
Companies examined









Final sample (Disclosing companies) 112 67%
Panel B - Country breakdown of the data set
Companies Non-disclosing FinalCountry
examined companies sample
UK 43 1 42
France 33 12 21
Germany 27 11 16
Holland 11 1 10
Switzerland 11 5 6
Sweden 6 1 5
Italy 9 5 4
Spain 6 3 3
Belgium 5 2 3
Finland 3 1 2
Russia 3 3 0
Norway 1 1 0
158 46 112
Panel C - Industry breakdown of the data set
Industry ~Companies Non-disclosing FinalIndustry
examined companies sample
Finance, insurance, real estate 42 12 30
Machinery and electronics 23 3 20
Wholesale and retail trade 22 4 18
Chemical, petroleum, glass 27 9 18
Transportation, utilities 19 8 11
Primary and fabricated metal 7 3 4
Food and tobacco 4 0 4
Services 4 1 3
Mining and construction 5 3 2










Table 2 Panel A - Descriptive statistics for the final sample
Mean Min QI1 Median Q3 Max Std Dev
Board Structure
N IndDirector 4.07 0 0 0 8 18 4.73
N_ExecDirector 3.22 0 0 3 6 11 2.97
N_EmplDirector 1.56 0 0 0 1 11 3.12
NOtherDirector 4.88 0 0 5 9 24 4.97
NDirector 13.72 4 11 13 16 26 4.39
InsiderMajority 0.15 0 0 0 0 1 0.35
InsiderRatio 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.44 0.80 0.22
CEO-Chair 0.31 0 0 0 1 1 0.46
Executive Compensation
NExecutive 8 1 5 5 9 60 8
Salary ('000 C) 794 0 449 633 930 6,420 677
Bonus('000 ) 312 0 18 213 436 4,537 440
Stock ('000 ) 180 0 0 0 58 4,227 510
Option ('000 E) 696 0 45 228 572 29,505 2,007
TotalPay ('000 4-') 1,982 81 877 1,398 2,184 32,747 2,483
StockHeld ('000 F) 2,291 0 0 100 733 165,250 14,960
OptionHeld('000 ) 1,617 0 94 476 1,591 21,795 3,156
Log(TotalPay) 7.25 4.39 6.78 7.24 7.69 10.40 0.79
IncentivePay 0.48 0.00 0.31 0.52 0.67 1.00 0.24
IncentiveHeld 3.23 0.00 0.21 0.72 1.61 294.59 20.94
Compensation )isclosure
SalaryDisclosure 0.98 0 1 1 1 1 0.14
StockDisclosure 0.91 0 1 1 1 1 0.29
AmountDisclosure 1.26 0 0 2 2 2 0.86
QualityDisclosure 1.48 0 1 2 2 2 0.70
Disclosure 4.62 0 4 5 6 6 1.54
The final sample consists
1999 to 2001.
of 336 firm-year observations across 112 European companies for the years
Board Structure
N_IndDirector is the number of independent directors. N_ExecDirector is the number of directors who
also serve as company executives. N_EmplDirector is the number of directors who are employees but
not executives. N_OtherDirector is the number of non-employee directors who are not classified as
independent. N_Director is the total number of directors. InsiderMajority is a dummy variable equal
-to if executives compose a numerical majority on the board and 0 otherwise. InsiderRatio is the ratio
of the number of directors serving as company executives to total number of directors. CEO-Chair is a
dummy variable equal to if the CEO serves as the chair of the board and 0 otherwise.
Executive Compensation
N_Executive is the number of executives used to compute company averages about executive
compensation for each company. Salary is the average annual fixed compensation per manager. Bonus
is the average annual bonus compensation per manager. Stock is the average value of annual stock
grants, calculated as the number of shares granted times the annual average stock price, per manager.
Option is the average Black-Scholes value of annual option grants per manager. TotalPay is the total
annual compensation per manager for each company. It is the sum of Salary, Bonus, Stock, and Option.
StockHeld and OptionHeld are respective average values of stocks and options held per manager for
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each company at the beginning of the fiscal year. Log(TotalPay) is the natural logarithm of TotalPay.
IncentivePay is the ratio of the sum of executive bonus, stock, and option grants to total executive
compensation for each company. It is the ratio of the sum of Bonus, Stock, and Option to TotalPay.
IncentiveHeld is the ratio of the sum of StockHeld and OptionHeld to TotalPay for each company.
Compensation Disclosure
SalaryDisclosure is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a company discloses its salary and bonus
compensation and 0 otherwise. StockDisclosure is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a company discloses
its stock and option compensation and 0 otherwise. AmountDisclosure measures the number of
disclosed compensation contracts. It takes numerical values of zero, one, and two, a higher value
indicating a higher number of disclosed contracts. QualityDisclosure measures disclosure quality. It
takes numerical values of zero, one, and two, a higher value indicating higher disclosure quality.
Disclosure is the overall measure for the type, amount, and quality of executive compensation
disclosure. Disclosure is the sum of CashDisclosure, StockDisclosure, QualityDisclosure, and
AmountDisclosure, and ranges from zero to six. A higher value for Disclosure indicates more
transparent disclosure of executive compensation.
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Table 2 Panel A, continued - Descriptive statistics for the final sample
Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Std Dev
Economic Determinants of Executive Compensation
TotalAssets (mn ) 121,618 1,933 12,342 35,289 138,942 911,926 185,413
Sales (mn ) 28,706 3,010 12,163 21,270 37,664 200,514 24,789
MCap (mn E) 35,200 437 9,176 18,809 44,553 361,823 44,155
WorkingCap (n ) 139 -174,805 -2,519 280 3,021 348,900 39,588
R&D (mn ) 570 0 0 31 555 6,000 1,054
OpProfit (mn ) 2,940 -14,436 637 1,415 3,488 35,382 5,360
NetIncome (mn ) 1,604 -14,653 359 955 2,360 17,979 2,825
CAPX (mn ) 1,501 -647 0 557 1,717 16,300 2,509
Log(TotalAssets) 10.66 7.57 9.42 10.47 11.84 13.72 1.47
Log(Sales) 9.98 8.01 9.41 9.97 10.54 12.21 0.74
Log(MCap) 9.85 6.08 9.12 9.84 10.70 12.80 1.17
WorkingCap 0.03 -0.40 -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.42 0.14
R&D 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.85 0.07
OpProfit 0.05 -0.72 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.30 0.07
NetIncome 0.04 -0.22 0.01 0.03 0.05 1.93 0.11
CAPX 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.34 0.05
M/B 3.22 -37.27 1.53 2.43 3.69 43.70 5.44
StockReturn 0.06 -0.94 -0.20 -0.02 0.19 7.41 0.60
DiverseOperations 0.56 0.04 0.44 0.61 0.69 0.83 0.18
VariableProfit 0.96 0.02 0.14 0.29 0.63 35.80 3.50
NListed 2.21 1 1 2 4 5 1.26
USListed 0.76 0 1 1 1 1 0.43
Block 0.23 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.89 0.17
N Employee 103,488 4,111 46,212 75,772 120,490 680,000 94,228
Economic Determinants of Executive Compensation
The variables of the first group are reported in million E's.
computed as either the natural logarithms of the variables in
The variables of the second group are
the first group (reported with the prefix
'Log') or as the variables in the first group deflated by company total assets (reported with no prefix).
The empirical tests in this paper use the variables in the second group. Other economic determinants of
executive compensation used in the empirical tests are reported in the third group.
TotalAssets is the total assets at the fiscal year end. Sales are total net sales. MCap is the market
capitalization of equity at the fiscal year end. WorkingCap is the working capital, calculated as the
difference between current assets and current liabilities. R&D is research and development expenses.
OpProfit is the net operating profit. NetIncome is the net income. CAPX is the capital expenditures.
M/B is market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end. StockReturn is
the annual stock return in the primary stock exchange where the company shares are traded.
DiverseOperations is the average of sales dispersions in product type and location, which are
calculated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman method. A high value of DiverseOperations indicates that
company sales are dispersed in terms of product type and location. VariableProfit is the coefficient of
variation of a company's operating profit. It is the standard deviation of the company's operating profit
divided by its time-series mean. NListed is the total number of stock exchanges on which a company's
shares are listed. USListed is a dummy variable equal to if a company's shares are listed as ADR or
OTC in the U.S. and 0 otherwise. Block is the sum of the percentages of the shares owned by the largest
three shareholders. Block is available for 156 observations. N_Employee is the number of employees.
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Table 3 Panel A - Descriptive statistics for top U.S. companies






Salary ('000 E) 1,025 260
Bonus ('000 ) 1,616 -303
Stock ('000 ) 925 0
Option ('000 &) 4,847 0
TotalPay ('000 E) 8,412 260
StockHeld ('000 E) 247,751 0





TotalAssets (mn E) 76,956 2,747
NetIncome (mn i) 1,769 -16,198
MCap (mn E) 50,729 366
The panel presents descriptive statistics for
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database for year 1995. The rest of the data are obtained from the ExecuComp database for the largest 150
U.S. companies for the years 1999 to 2001. Table 2 Panel A presents the variable definitions.
Table 3 Panel B - Descriptive statistics for the non-disclosing companies








TotalAssets (mn C') 109,641
WorkingCap (n E) -4,894 -15'






















































































examined for the years 1999 to 2001. The number of observations for all variables is 138, except for Block
with 30 available observations. Table 2 Panel A presents the variable definitions.
Table 4 - Incentive compensation and dependent boards




0.42 -0.59 0.34 -0.45 -0.87 -0.66
Constant ~(18.6) (-3.32) (2.17) (-2.14) (-6.43) (-1.96)
InsiderRatio + 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19
(2.25) (2.75) (1.83) (2.52) (2.80)
CEO-Chair + 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.01
(3.07) (3.79) (0.67) (0.77) (0.30)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IncentveHeld - ~(0.76) (0.48) (0.26) (0.51)
Log(TotalPay) + 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.20
(5.62) (5.47) (6.60) (2.43)
-0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02
Log(TotalAssets,) + (-0.08) (-0.36) (1.48) (-0.72)
StockReturn + (0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(1.86) (1.41) (0.78) (1.41)
0.06 0.10 0.08 0.09
~NetIncome + ~(1.00) (1.19) (0.94) (1.13)
0.08 0.13 0.14 0.15
WorkngCap + ~(0.71) (1.23) (1.34) (1.30)
0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.05
DverseOperations + (0.27) (-0.36) (0.75) (-0.47)
~~M/B~ + ~0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.14) (0.93) (1.05) (0.90)
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
-N Executive -(-0.55) (-0.90) (-0.70) (-0.70)
~NDirector -- 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
ND~~~recto~- ~ (-0.61) (-0.52) (-0.75) (-0.24)
Industry, year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 4.7% 32.7% 20.6% 35.2% 36.4% 36.5%
Number of observations 336 336 336 336 336 336
The table presents coefficients and two-tailed t-values (in parentheses) from regressions with
IncentivePay as the dependent variable. The data set comprises three annual observations for the years
11999 to 2001 for the 112 disclosing companies. Models 1 to 5 present OLS regressions with or without
board dependence variables, control variables, and industry, year, and country fixed effects. The t-values
are adjusted for the within-company dependence of the annual observations. Industry, year, and country
coefficients are omitted for brevity. Model 6 is a regression using two-stage least squares to control for
the potential endogeneity between incentive compensation and the level of compensation. The
instrumental variables are company size, Log(TotalAssets), and the average level of pay in the company's
industry and country.
IncentivePay is the ratio of the sum of executive bonus, stock, and option grants to total executive
compensation for each company. InsiderRatio is the ratio of the number of directors serving as company
executives to total number of directors. CEO-Chair is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO serves as
the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. IncentiveHeld is the ratio of the value of stocks and options held
to total annual compensation per manager for each company. Log(TotalPay) is the natural logarithm of
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total annual compensation per manager. Log(TotalAssets) is the natural logarithm of the total assets at
the fiscal year end. StockReturn is the annual stock return in the primary stock exchange where the
company shares are traded. NetIncome is the net income deflated by total assets. WorkingCap is the
working capital, computed as the difference between current assets and current liabilities, deflated by total
assets. DiverseOperations is the average of sales dispersions in product type and location, with a higher
value indicating more dispersed sales in terms of product type and location. M/B is market value of equity
divided by book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. NExecutive is the number of executives
used to compute averages about executive compensation for each company. N_Director is the total
number of directors.
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Table 5 - The effect of insider dominance on the relation between incentive
dependent boards
compensation and
CEO-Chair = 0 CEO-Chair = 1 Total Sample
InsiderMajority=0
0.25 0.38 0.34Coefficient for InsiderRatio .(2.72) (2.20) (3.80)
Adjusted R2 22.8% 44.7% 39.1%
Number of observations 200 87 287
InsiderMajority= 1
1.36 -0.73 0.30Coefficient for InsiderRatio 1.36 -0.73 0.30(1.59) (-1.82) (0.75)
Adjusted R2 74.8% 91.5% 88.7%
Number of observations 33 16 49
Total Sample
0.22 0.05 0.20Coefficient for InsiderRatio (3.26) (040) (20(3.26) (0.40) (2.90)
Adjusted R2 41.5% 60.6% 39.2%
Number of observations 233 103 336
The table presents the coefficients for InsiderRatio and two-tailed t-values (in parentheses) from OLS
regressions with IncentivePay as the dependent variable. The data set is split according to the presence of
i) a numerical majority of executives on the board and ii) a CEO-Chair. IncentivePay is regressed on
InsiderRatio and the economic determinants of executive compensation for each group of companies.
IncentivePay = f (InsiderRatio, IncentiveHeld, Log(TotalPay), Log(TotalAssets), StockReturn,
NetIncome, WorkingCap, DiverseOperations, M/B, N Executive, NDirector)
The coefficients for the other determinants of IncentivePay are omitted for brevity. The t-values are
adjusted for the within-company dependence of the annual observations.
InsiderMajority is a dummy variable equal to 1 if executives compose a numerical majority on the board
and 0 otherwise. CEO-Chair is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO serves as the chair of the board
and 0 otherwise. IncentivePay is the ratio of the sum of executive bonus, stock, and option grants to total
executive compensation for each company. InsiderRatio is the ratio of the number of directors serving as
company executives to total number of directors. IncentiveHeld is the ratio of the value of stocks and
options held to total annual compensation per manager for each company. Log(TotalPay) is the natural
logarithm of total annual compensation per manager. Log(TotalAssets) is the natural logarithm of the
total assets at the fiscal year end. StockReturn is the annual stock return in the primary stock exchange
where the company shares are traded. NetIncome is the net income deflated by total assets. WorkingCap
is the working capital, computed as the difference between current assets and current liabilities, deflated
by total assets. DiverseOperations is the average of sales dispersions in product type and location, with a
higher value indicating more dispersed sales in terms of product type and location. M/B is market value
of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. NExecutive is the number of
executives used to compute averages about executive compensation for each company. NDirector is the
total number of directors.
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Table 6 - Sample selection bias
Predicted Disclosing companies All companies
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.06 -0.72 -0.06 0.14 -0.66 0.44
Constant ~(0.59) (-5.62) (-0.61) (1.88) (-5.87) (3.75)
0.17 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.13 -0.05
InsderRatio + (2.77) (2.48) (3.35) (3.05) (3.27) (-0.74)
CEOChair + 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06
(3.65) (3.38) (2.36) (3.91) (3.86) (2.14)
0.00 0.00IncentiveHeld - (0.02) (0.13)(0.02) (0.13)
0.14 0.14Log(TotalPay) + (6.66) (7.32)(6.66) (7.32)
0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01
Log(TotalAssets) + (4.33) (1.12) (5.41) (4.37) (1.41) (0.61)
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
StockReturn + (0.92) (1.50) (0.62) (0.76) (1.42) (0.15)
0.12 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.06 0.05
NetIncome + (1.40) (0.87) (1.70) (1.47) (1.08) (0.60)
0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.05
WorkngCap + (1.32) (1.35) (1.22) (1.32) (1.29) (0.38)
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
N4/MI~ B + ~(1.52 (1.00) (1.99) (1.73) (1.16) (0.59)
-0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.01
NElrector - (-2.58) (-1.00) (-6.50) (-3.31) (-1.99) (2.69)
Adjusted R2 11.6% 29.3% 14.5% 10.6% 29.2% 3.0%
Number of observations 336 336 474 474 474 474
The table presents coefficients and two-tailed t-values (in parentheses) from the OLS regressions with
IncentivePay as the dependent variable. The t-values are adjusted for the within-company dependence of
the annual observations. Models 1 and 2 present regressions using three annual observations from the 112
companies disclosing executive compensation. Models 3 to 6 present regressions using three annual
observations from the 158 companies with available or missing compensation data. The missing data on
IncentivePay, IncentiveHeld, and Log(TotalPay) for the 46 non-disclosing companies are assigned
different values for each model. In model 3, IncentivePay for each non-disclosing company is assumed to
be 0. In models 4 and 5, the missing compensation data for each company are assumed to be the average
of the following two variables: i) average compensation of companies sharing the same industry, and ii)
average compensation of companies sharing the same country. In model 6, IncentivePay for each non-
disclosing company is assumed to be 1.
IncentivePay is the ratio of the sum of executive bonus, stock, and option grants to total executive
compensation for each company. InsiderRatio is the ratio of the number of directors serving as company
executives to total number of directors. CEO-Chair is a dummy variable equal to if the CEO serves as
the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. IncentiveHeld is the ratio of the value of stocks and options held
to total annual compensation per manager for each company. Log(TotalPay) is the natural logarithm of
total annual compensation per manager. Log(TotalAssets) is the natural logarithm of the total assets at
the fiscal year end. StockReturn is the annual stock return in the primary stock exchange where the
company shares are traded. NetIncome is the net income deflated by total assets. WorkingCap is the
working capital, computed as the difference between current assets and current liabilities, deflated by total
assets. M/B is market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year.
N Director is the total number of directors.
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Table 7 - The effect of international institutional factors on the relation between incentive
compensation and dependent boards
Institutional Factors
Importance Outside
Common of Equity Investor Country Legal
Law Market Rights Disclosure Enforcement Block
InsiderRatio 0.26 0.56 0.59 1.92 0.82 0.10
(2.82) (4.00) (3.83) (2.76) (1.24) (0.79)
CEO-Chair 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07 -0.02
(2.47) (2.12) (1.78) (2.46) (3.02) (-0.55)
Institutional Factor 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.25
(1.45) (1.32) (4.66) (3.07) (-1.27) (-1.53)
InsiderRatio* -0.31 -0.02 -0.18 -0.03 -0.07 0.89
Institutional Factor (-1.95) (-2.78) (-4.16) (-2.65) (-1.04) (2.18)
Adjusted R2 30.3% 31.2% 34.3% 32.2% 31.7% 33.2%
No. of observations 336 336 336 336 336 156
The table presents coefficients and two-tailed t-values (in parentheses) from the OLS regressions with
IncentivePay as the dependent variable. The regression model for each column includes an institutional
factor, which is indicated at the top of the column, and an interaction term between InsiderRatio and that
institutional factor.
IncentivePay = f (InsiderRatio, CEO-Chair, Institutional Factor, InsiderRatio * Institutional Factor,
IncentiveHeld, Log(TotalPay), Log(TotalAssets), StockReturn, NetIncome, WorkingCap,
DiverseOperations, MIB, NExecutive, NDirector).
The coefficients for the economic determinants of IncentivePay are omitted for brevity. The t-values are
adjusted for the within-country dependence of the observations.
IncentivePay is the ratio of the sum of executive bonus, stock, and option grants to total executive
compensation for each company. InsiderRatio is the ratio of the number of directors serving as company
executives to total number of directors. CEO-Chair is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO serves as
the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. IncentiveHeld is the ratio of the value of stocks and options held
to total annual compensation per manager for each company. Log(TotalPay) is the natural logarithm of
total annual compensation per manager. Log(TotalAssets) is the natural logarithm of the total assets at
the fiscal year end. StockReturn is the annual stock return in the primary stock exchange where the
company shares are traded. NetIncome is the net income deflated by total assets. WorkingCap is the
working capital, calculated as the difference between current assets and current liabilities, deflated by
total assets. DiverseOperations is the average of sales dispersions in product type and location, with a
higher value indicating more dispersed sales in terms of product type and location. M/B is market value
of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. N Executive is the number of
executives used to compute averages about executive compensation for each company. N_Director is the
total number of directors.
The institutional factors are defined next. Common Law is the dummy variable for the common law
country (the U.K.) as in La Porta et al. (1998). Importance of Equity Market is measured by the mean
rank across three variables in La Porta et al. (1997): (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market
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capitalization held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the number of listed domestic firms relative
to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative to the population. Importance of Equity Market is
taken from Leuz et al. (2003). Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index in La Porta et al.
('1998). It is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights. Country Disclosure is the disclosure
index in La Porta et al. (1998) and measures the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 1990 annual
reports. Legal Enforcement is the mean across the three legal variables in La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the
efficiency of the judicial system, (2) assessment of the rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. Block is
the sum of the percentages of the shares owned by the largest three shareholders. Block is available for
156 observations only.
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Table 8 - Transparency of compensation disclosure and board dependence
Predicted Set Set 2 Set 3
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
4.90 8.69 4.96 5.53 5.79 6.83
Constant ~(3.00) (5.58) (3.16) (3.62) (3.36) (4.40)
5.09 6.27 0.10 2.57
InsiderRatio + (8.11) (10.37) (0.16) (4.02)
CEO-Chair + -0.19 -0.25 0.75 0.41
(-0.67) (-1.02) (3.01) (1.62)
1.03 0.86 0.84
IncentvePay ±+~ (2.11) (2.19) (2.08)
0.46 0.28 0.31
Log(TotalPay) + 0.46 0.28 0.31(2.80) (2.09) (2.27)
-0.06 -0.76 -0.05 -0.50 -0.06 -0.57
Log(TotalAssets) + (-0.40) (-4.97) (-0.49) (-4.26) (-0.50) (-4.70)
~~M/B + ~ 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03
(0.58) (0.48) (-0.34) (-1.32) (-0.46) (-1.18)
NetIncome ± 8.99 9.35 4.74 4.96 5.23 4.83
(2.72) (3.09) (1.82) (2.07) (1.99) (1.93)
0.09 -0.21 0.24 -0.03 0.28 0.05
NLHise + (0.86) (-2.38) (2.91) (-0.39) (3.43) (0.64)
-0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.04
NDirector - (-5.30) (-1.10) (-1.36) (1.63) (-0.82) (1.50)
Industry, year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 8.9% 22.1% 28.5% 38.3% 27.8% 36.8%
Number of observations 474 336 474 336 474 336
The table presents coefficients and two-tailed t-values (in parentheses) from the Tobit regressions with
Disclosure as the dependent variable. Model 1 uses annual observations for the years 1999 to 2001 from
the 158 companies with available or missing compensation data. Model 2 uses annual observations for
the years 1999 to 2001 from the 112 disclosing companies. Models 1 and 2 of Set 1 include industry and
year fixed effects, and those of Set 2 and 3 use industry, year, and country fixed effects. The coefficients
for industry, year, and country are omitted for brevity.
Disclosure is the overall measure for the type, amount, and quality of executive compensation disclosure.
It ranges from zero to six. A higher value for Disclosure indicates more transparent disclosure of
executive compensation. InsiderRatio is the ratio of the number of directors serving as company
executives to total number of directors. CEO-Chair is a dummy variable equal to if the CEO serves as
the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. IncentivePay is the ratio of the sum of executive bonus, stock, and
option grants to total executive compensation for each company. Log(TotalPay) is the natural logarithm
of total annual compensation per manager. Log(TotalAssets) is the natural logarithm of the total assets at
the fiscal year end.. M/B is market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the fiscal
year. NetIncome is the net income deflated by total assets. N_Listed is the total number of stock
exchanges on which a company's shares are listed. NDirector is the total number of directors.
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Table 9 - The effect of institutional factors on transparency of compensation disclosure
Institutional Factors
Importance Outside
Common of Equity Investor Country Legal
Law Market Rights Disclosure Enforcement Block
-0.64 2.96 1.87 3.18 6.13 2.76
InsderRao (-1.12) (5.23) (3.15) (5.52) (10.3) (3.52)
CEO-Chair 1.08 0.16 -0.42 -0.20 -0.47 -0.54
(4.50) (0.65) (-1.68) (-0.81) (-0.18) (-1.58)
5.57 0.20 1.06 0.21 1.22 -4.73
InstitutionalFactor (14.8) (11.5) (11.3) (10.2) (9.60) (-5.85)
Pseudo R2 22.3% 16.1% 15.7% 14.5% 14.1% 12.8%
No. of observations 474 474 474 474 474 156
The table presents coefficients and two-tailed t-values (in parentheses) from the Tobit regressions with
Disclosure as the dependent variable. The regression model for each column includes, as an independent
variable, an institutional factor, which is indicated at the top of the column.
Disclosure = f (InsiderRatio, CEO-Chair, Institutional Factor, Log(TotalAssets), MIB, NetIncome,
NListed, N_Director, industry, year)
The coefficients fior the other determinants of Disclosure are omitted for brevity. Disclosure is the overall
measure for the type, amount, and quality of executive compensation disclosure. It ranges from zero to
six. A higher value for Disclosure indicates more transparent disclosure of executive compensation.
InsiderRatio is the ratio of the number of directors serving as company executives to total number of
directors. CEO-Chair is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO serves as the chair of the board and 0
otherwise. IncentivePay is the ratio of the sum of executive bonus, stock, and option grants to total
executive compensation for each company. Log(TotalPay) is the natural logarithm of total annual
compensation per manager. Log(TotalAssets) is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the fiscal year
end. M/B is market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year.
NetIncome is the net income deflated by total assets. N_Listed is the total number of stock exchanges on
which a company's shares are listed. N_Director is the total number of directors.
The institutional factors are defined next. Common Law is the dummy variable for the common law
country (the U.K.) as in La Porta et al. (1998). Importance of Equity Market is measured by the mean
rank across three variables in La Porta et al. (1997): (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market
capitalization held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the number of listed domestic firms relative
to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative to the population. Importance of Equity Market is
taken from Leuz et al. (2003). Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index in La Porta et al.
(1998). It is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights. Country Disclosure is the disclosure
index in La Porta et al. (1998) and measures the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 1990 annual
reports. Legal Enforcement is the mean across three legal variables in La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the
efficiency of the judicial system, (2) assessment of the rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. Block is
the sum of the percentages of the shares owned by the largest three shareholders. Block is available for
156 observations only.
58
Appendix 1 - European companies in the dataset and average values of the major variables
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Appendix 2 - Disclosure practices across companies in the data set
Annual reports are the most comprehensive data sources about compensation practices.
Alternative sources, such as company web sites, either repeat or summarize the executive
compensation information contained in the annual reports. The proxy Disclosure measures the
transparency of compensation disclosure in the annual report for each firm-year observation.
Disclosure incorporates three aspects of compensation disclosure: type, amount, and quality.
Type of Disclosure: A company receives 1 point each if it explicitly discloses salary and
bonus (SalaryDisclosure) and stock and option (StockDisclosure) compensation.
Amount of Disclosure: AmountDisclosure measures the number of disclosed
compensation contracts. Companies that merely disclose either average executive pay or the
compensation contract of only one executive receive no points; those that disclose two contracts
receive 1 point; and those that disclose more than two contracts receive 2 points.
Quality of Disclosure: QualityDisclosure measures the extent to which a company
releases the following information: (i) overall compensation policy and goals, (ii) pay-setting
guidelines for specific positions, (iii) executive compensation in previous years, and (iv) future
determinants of executive compensation. Companies that disclose none of the above items
receive no points; those that disclose some receive 1 point; and those that disclose all items
receive 2 points.
Disclosure, which is the sum of SalaryDisclosure, StockDisclosure, AmountDisclosure,
and QualityDisclosure, takes a value between 0 and 6, with higher values indicating a higher
extent and quality of disclosure. Companies with Disclosure scores between 0 and 3 are excluded
from the empirical tests because these low scores generally result from the insufficient
compensation data. Companies with scores between 3 and 6 are included in the empirical tests.
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The mean Disclosure score for the 112 companies that are included in the data set is 4.62;
the mean score for the 46 companies that are excluded is 1.62. The country of origin and the
related legal disclosure requirements considerably affect the Disclosure score. The companies in
the U.K. are the most transparent with a score of 5.81. The companies in Russia are the least
transparent with a score of 0.33. However, the country origin is not the only determinant of
compensation disclosure (Table 8). The Disclosure score varies significantly across companies
within the same country. For instance, the mean Disclosure for French companies is 3.27. Out of
the French companies, Michelin has a score of 2 and Schneider Electric has a score of 6.
Below are three examples on the disclosure practices of the companies in the sample. The
examples also describe how the Disclosure proxy is constructed. The first example (BP Amoco
with a Disclosure score of 6) exemplifies a high-disclosure company. The second example
(Michelin with a Disclosure score of 2) exemplifies a low-disclosure company. The third
example (Schneider Electric with a Disclosure score of 6) exemplifies the wide range of
compensation disclosure practices within a country (e.g., France).
Example 1 - British Petroleum (BP)'s disclosure of executive compensation
BP 2001 annual report page 29:
"Board/Executive relationship
The board/executive relationship policy sets out how the board delegates authority to the group chief
executive and the extent of that authority. In its goals policy, the board states the long-term outcome it
expects the group chief executive to deliver. The restrictions on the manner in which the group chief
executive may achieve the required results are set out in the executive limitations policy, which addresses
ethics, health, safety, the environment, financial distress, internal control, risk preferences, treatment of
employees and political considerations. On all these matters, the board's role is to set general policy and
to monitor the implementation of that policy by the group chief executive. The group chief executive
explains how he intends to deliver the required outcome in annual and medium-term plans, the former of
which include a comprehensive assessment of the risks to delivery. Progress towards the expected
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outcome is set out in a monthly report that covers actual results and a forecast of results for the current
year. The board reviews this report at each meeting.
The board/executive relationship policy also sets out how the group chief executive's performance will be
monitored and recognizes that, in the multitude of changing circumstances, judgement is always involved.
The group chief executive is obliged through dialogue and systematic review to discuss with the board all
material matters currently or prospectively affecting the company and its performance and all strategic
projects or developments. This specifically includes any materially under-performing business activities
and actions that breach the executive limitations policy. It also includes social, environmental and ethical
considerations. This dialogue is a key feature of the board/executive relationship. Between board
meetings the chairman has responsibility for ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of the
board/executive relationship. The systems set out in the board/executive relationship policy are designed
to manage rather than eliminate the risk of failure to achieve the board goals policy or observe the
executive limitations policy. They provide reasonable, not absolute, assurance against material
misstatement or loss.
Remuneration of executive directors
The board, through its Remuneration Committee, sets the rewards for the group chief executive and
executive directors. The committee's policy and details of remuneration in 2001 are set out on pages 31
to 35 of this report."
Pages 31 to 35
"Reward policy
The Remuneration Committee's reward policy reflects its belief in the need to attract, motivate and retain
world-class executive talent. The main principles of the policy are:
* Total reward levels should reflect the competitive global market and the committee actively seeks
independent advice on this.
* The majority of the total reward is linked to achievement of demanding performance targets as shown in
the descriptions of the elements of remuneration and the chart opposite. By way of illustration, in 2001
over three-quarters of the executive directors' remuneration was performance-based.
* Executive directors should share the interests of shareholders in making BP successful to the benefit of
all shareholders. This is achieved through setting robust performance targets based on measures of
shareholders' interests and through the committee's policy for executive directors to hold a significant
shareholding in the company, currently equivalent to 5 x their base salary.
* The performance targets in the Executive Directors' Long Term Incentive Plan must encompass
demanding comparisons of BP's shareholder returns and earnings with those of other companies in its
own industry and in other sectors as well.
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* The committee continually assesses whether the reward structure is achieving its objectives. In late
2001, it reviewed the existing remuneration of all executive directors relative to a comparator group of
global companies. After taking independent external advice the committee agreed that there should be no
major changes in the framework for total reward. In 2002 it will be reviewing long-term incentive awards.
* In 2002 base salaries for the executive directors will be increased by less than 10%, in line with similar
global companies.
* All UK executive directors appointed after 1996 should hold a contract of service with a maximum of a
one-year period of notice.
Elements of remuneration
An increasing share of executive directors' pay is performance-related with the majority now based on
long-term performance (see chart below). The more senior the executive, the greater the proportion of 'at
risk' remuneration.
The executive directors' total remuneration consists of performance related and fixed components.
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Performance-based components
There are long-term and short-term performance-related components. The Executive Directors' Long
Term Incentive Plan (EDLTIP), which was approved by shareholders in April 2000, includes a share
element, a share option element and a cash element.
The share element compares BP's performance against oil majors over three years, on a rolling basis.
This has been assessed in terms of a three-year shareholder return against the market (SHRAM), return
on average capital employed (ROACE) and earnings per share (EPS) growth.
The committee reviews and approves annually the performance measures and the comparator
companies. The comparator group of companies used for the SHRAM performance condition in the share
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element has been reduced so much by industry consolidation that the committee has decided for the
2002-2004 Plan to change to the FTSE All World Oil and Gas Index weighted by market capitalization.
The committee is satisfied that this change does not make the performance targets of the Plan less
demanding.
Performance units are granted at the beginning of the period and converted into an award of shares at
the end of the three-year period, depending on performance. It is a condition for any such award that the
individual holds shares equivalent to at least 5 x base salary. Shares awarded are then held in trust for
three years before they are released to the individual. This gives the executive directors a six-year
incentive structure, and ensures their interests are aligned with those of shareholders. The share option
element reflects BP's performance relative to a wider selection of global companies. The committee will
take into account BP's total shareholder return (TSR) compared with the TSR for the FTSE Global 100
group of companies over the three years preceding the grant. The cash element allows the Remuneration
Committee to grant cash rather than share-based incentives in exceptional circumstances. This element
was not used in 2001. The short-term performance-related component of executive directors'
remuneration consists of an annual bonus. The Remuneration Committee reviews and sets bonus targets
and level of eligibility annually. The target level is 100% of base salary (except for Lord Browne who has a
110% target). There is a stretch level of 150% of base salary for substantially exceeding targets. Targets
consist of a mix of demanding financial targets and other leadership objectives covering areas such as
people, safety, environment and organization.
Fixed components
'The fixed components of remuneration are:
· Salary Fixed sum payable monthly in cash. The committee reviews salaries periodically in line with
global markets. The appropriate survey groups are defined and analysed by a leading remuneration
consultancy.
,, Pension Executive directors are eligible to participate in the appropriate pension schemes applying in
their home countries.
- Benefits and other share schemes Executive directors are eligible to participate in regular employee
benefit plans, including health and life insurance, and in all-employee share schemes and savings plans,
as applicable in their home countries.
* Resettlement allowance Expatriates may receive a resettlement allowance for a limited period.
Results for 2001
The company achieved a strong result in 2001, leading the industry on ROACE and EPS growth. SHRAM
results placed BP second in the group of comparable oil companies. Cumulative savings on the combined
cost structure of the enlarged group reached their target of $5.8 billion pre-tax, compared with a 1998
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base. There was excellent progress on leadership targets such as people, safety, environment and
organization.
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Long-term performance-based components
Long Term Performance Plan (LTPP) and share element
The LTPP award for the 1999-2001 performance period is made in February 2002 based on results
achieved. The shares then have a minimum three years' retention in trust and no shares will be released
until the director has a personal holding of BP shares equivalent to 5 x base salary.
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For the 1998-2000 LTPP BP's performance was assessed in terms of three-year shareholder return
against the market (SHRAM) in relation to the following companies: Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and
Texaco. BP came first in the 1998-2000 Plan, and the Remuneration Committee made the maximum
award of shares to executive directors in 2001. For the 1999-2001 Plan BP's SHRAM again exceeded
ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil and TotalFinaElf, but came second to Shell. The Remuneration Committee
has also considered profitability and growth targets for the 1999-2001 Plan, i.e. return on average capital
employed (ROACE) and earnings per share (EPS) growth. On both measures BP came first in assessing
performance against the same oil companies.
Based on an initial performance assessment of 175 points out of 200, the committee expects to make an
award of shares to executive directors as set out in the 1999-2001 column of the above LTPP table.
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Share option element and other option schemes
Option grants in 2001 were made taking into consideration the ranking of the company's total shareholder
return (TSR) against the TSR of the FTSE Global 100 group of companies over the three-year period
from 1 January 1998. Options granted vest over three years (one-third each after one, two and three
years respectively) and have a life of seven years after grant. Executive directors who retire after 1
January 2002 may retain vested options for this period.
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Short-term performance-based component
Executive directors' annual bonus awards for 2001 were based on a mix of financial targets and
leadership objectives established at the beginning of the year. Assessment of all the targets showed that,
compared with a target performance of 100 points, 135 points were achieved, resulting in bonus awards




































Each year the committee receives independent advice on competitive global salary markets for the group
chief executive and for the other executive directors. Taking into account this advice and the fact that
base salaries had not previously been increased since October 1999, the committee decided to increase
Lord Browne's salary by 47% and the other executive directors' salaries by an average of 15% for 2001.
Service contracts
All executive directors appointed since 1996 hold a contract of service which includes a period of notice of
one year or less, except Mr Ford. Lord Browne and Mr Chase were appointed prior to 1996 and have
contracts with a two-year notice period. The board does not consider it in shareholders' interests to
renegotiate these contracts.
Mr Ford has resigned from the board of BP p.l.c. with effect from 31 March 2002, at which time his
secondment will end. His underlying US employment agreement with BP Corporation North America has
a two month notice period. If his contract is terminated by BP Corporation North America without cause, it
is required to pay him $1 million per annum (pro rated for part years) for each year between the date of
severance and 21 January 2004.
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UK directors are members of the BP Pension Scheme. The Scheme offers Inland Revenue-approved
retirement benefits based on final salary. It is the principal section of the BP Pension Fund, the latter
being set up under trust deed. Company contributions to the Fund are made on the advice of the actuary
appointed by the Trustee. No company contributions were made during 2001. Scheme members' core
benefits are non-contributory. They include a pension accrual of 1/60th of basic salary for each year of
service, subject to a maximum of two-thirds of final basic salary; a lump-sum death-in-service benefit of
three times salary; and a dependant's benefit of two-thirds of the member's pension. The Scheme
pension is not integrated with state pension benefits. Normal retirement age is 60, but Scheme members
who have 30 or more years' pensionable service at age 55 can elect to retire early without an actuarial
reduction being applied to their pension. Pensions payable from the Fund are guaranteed to be increased
annually in line with changes to the Retail Prices Index, up to a maximum of 5% a year.
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Directors accrue pension on a non-contributory basis at the enhanced rate of 2/60ths of their final salary
for each year of service as executive directors (up to the same two-thirds limit). None of the directors is
affected by the pensionable earnings cap.
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US directors participate in the BP Retirement Accumulation Plan. Under this Plan, the amount of the
annuity they are eligible to receive on a single-life basis is determined using a cash balance formula. The
Plan was established in 2000; it superseded earlier group pension and cash balance plans. However,
those employees who satisfied certain age and service conditions at the date of transition to the Plan
were provided with minimum benefits equal to those they would have earned under their previous
pension arrangements. In line with US tax regulations, benefits are provided through a combination of tax
qualified and restoration/nonqualified plans, as appropriate. Under these 'grandfathering' arrangements,
the annuity benefit formula (which includes a percentage of US Social Security benefits) is calculated at
1.67% x years of participation x average annual earnings. These earnings are determined by taking
separately the three highest consecutive calendar years' earnings from salary and the three highest
consecutive calendar years' bonus awards during the 10 years preceding retirement. The maximum
annuity is 60% of such average earnings.
Normal pensionable age is 65. No actuarial reduction is applied to the pension if it is paid from age 60;
however, a reduction of 5% a year is applied if paid between ages 50 and 59. Mr Ford is subject to the
'grandfathering' arrangements and his figures have been disclosed on this basis. Dr Grote is not subject
to the 'grandfathering' arrangements. His benefit is determined by the cash balance formula, under which
each year of service accrues a monetary credit in a current account. The credit is based on a sliding
scale, referencing age and service, and is subject to a minimum of 4% and a maximum of 11% of eligible
pay. The account balance earns interest on a monthly basis.
The Remuneration Committee
The Remuneration Committee decides the remuneration policy and sets the terms of engagement and
total rewards of the executive directors. The committee agrees each executive director's service contract,
salary, targets and bonus scheme, and the grants of options and performance units under the Executive
Directors' Long Term Incentive Plan.
Its members are all independent non-executive directors. The current membership is Sir Robin Nicholson
(chairman), Mr Knight, Sir Ian Prosser, Mr Davis and Dr Julius. During the year Mrs Block, Mr Ferris and
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the Lord Wright of Richmond retired. Like other directors, each member of the committee is subject to
periodic re-election every three years. They have no personal financial interest, other than as
shareholders, in the committee's decisions. They have no conflicts of interest arising from cross-
directorships with the executive directors nor from being involved in the day-to-day business of the
company. The committee met five times in the period under review. The committee consults the group
chief executive on matters relating to other executive directors who report to him. He is not present when
matters affecting his own remuneration are considered. The chairman of the board also attends meetings
when appropriate. The committee is serviced independently of the executive management and actively
seeks advice from external professional consultants. In its constitution and operation it complies with the
'Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice' set out by the Listing Rules of the Financial
Services Authority (FSA). Ernst & Young LLP have confirmed that the scope of their report on the
accounts covers the disclosures contained in this report that are specified for audit by the Listing Rules."
BP Disclosure Score
Type of Compensation Disclosure: BP explicitly discloses its fixed and variable compensation
(SalaryDisclosure = 1 and StockDisclosure = 1).
Amount of Compensation Disclosure: BP discloses the compensation of its top six executive
directors (AmountDisclosure = 2).
Quality of Compensation Disclosure: The annual report includes extensive discussions about
(i) overall compensation policy and goals, (ii) pay-setting guidelines for specific positions, (iii)
executive compensation in previous years, and (iv) future determinants of executive
compensation (QualityDisclosure = 2).
Disclosure, which is the sum of SalaryDisclosure, StockDisclosure, AmountDisclosure,
and QualityDisclosure, is 6.
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Example 2 - Michelin's disclosure of executive compensation
Michelin 2001 annual report page 66:
"Compensation paid to the Managing Partners and Supervisory Board
Managing Partners
- Under the terms of the Company's bylaws, as General Partners of the Company, the three Managing
Partners receive a certain proportion of the Company's net income. The total amount paid to them in 2001
out of 2000 net income was (E5,998,487.33
- The Managing Partners do not receive any compensation or benefits."
Page 89
"23. Management compensation
Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin is administered by Managing Partners ("Gerants") who
are also general partners ("associ6s commandit6s") of the Company. As such, they are entitled to a share
of the income distributed among all the general partners in accordance with the provisions of the
Company's bylaws. The Managing Partners do not receive any compensation or other benefits from
Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates."
Michelin Disclosure Score
Type of Compensation Disclosure: Michelin explicitly discloses that it grants no fixed
compensation and reveals the amount of the bonus payments (SalaryDisclosure = 1). The stock
and option compensation is reported to be nonexistent (StockDisclosure = 1).
Amount of Compensation Disclosure: Michelin discloses only the average executive pay
(AmountDisclosure is 0).
Quality of Compensation Disclosure: The compensation disclosure in the annual report is very
limited. There is no discussion about (i) overall compensation policy and goals, (ii) pay-setting
guidelines for specific positions, (iii) executive compensation in previous years, and (iv) future
determinants of executive compensation (QualityDisclosure is 0).
Disclosure., which is the sum of SalaryDisclosure, StockDisclosure, AmountDisclosure,
and QualityDisclosure, is 2.
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Example 3 - Schneider Electric's disclosure of executive compensation
Schneider Electric 2001 annual report page 23:
"Schneider Electric uses a number of methods to give employees a personal and fair stake in the
Company's achievements, including profit-linked incentive programs, employee share ownership, stock
options, variable compensation and bonuses. Depending on the country and position, variable
compensation can represent 10% to 25% of a manager's fixed salary. The collective portion of variable
compensation is based on operating margin while the individual portion is based on targets met by the
unit and on personal performance.
Although stock options are granted in fixed amounts, the number of options that may be exercised is
dependent upon the Company reaching its financial objectives. For example, the number of stock options
that may be exercised by the recipients of our most recent grant of stock options will depend on the
achievement of the sales and operating margin objectives of our NEW2004 program."
Pages 48 and 49
"Remunerations and Appointments Committee
From January 1 to October 19, 2001, the Remunerations and Appointments Committee comprised:
MM. Claude Bbear, Chairman, Jean-Rene Fourtou, Michel Frangois-Poncet, Henri Lachmann, Didier
Pineau-Valencienne.
The Committee's current members: MM. Claude Bebear, Chairman; Jean-Rene Fourtou, Michel Frangois-
Poncet, Henri Lachmann.
The Committee is regularly informed of the Group's compensation policies, especially executive
compensation. It reviews stock option plans and employee stock purchase plans decided by the Board
and makes recommendations to the Board concerning the remuneration of corporate officers and the
appointment of Directors and members of Board Committees. In 2001, the Committee recommended
eliminating the position of Chief Operating Officer and appointing Willy Kissling as a Director. The
Remunerations and Appointments Committee met four times in 2001, with an attendance rate of 84%. It
informed the Board of Directors of its findings on February 28, October 19 and December 12, 2001.
Remuneration of Corporate Officers and Executive Committee Members
The Remunerations and Appointments Committee makes recommendations to the Board of Directors
concerning the remuneration of corporate officers. It also reviews executive compensation, particularly for
members of the Executive Committee. Since reorganizing in October 2001, General Management has
been represented by an eight member Executive Committee chaired by Henri Lachmann. The Executive
Committee members are paid a fixed salary plus a variable bonus representing a certain percentage of
their fixed salary. The total remuneration package of each member is set at a competitive level compared
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with the remuneration paid to members of senior management of similar industrial groups in their
respective countries. The amount of each package is determined based on analyses and comparisons
performed by international consulting firms specialized in executive remuneration issues. Executive
bonuses are determined based on objectives set at the beginning of the year. They can therefore vary
significantly, depending on the degree to which the objectives are met. The objectives concern Schneider
Electric's performance (consolidated sales and net income before goodwill) and they also include
quantitative targets related to the unit headed by the executive concerned or qualitative targets based on
personal performance. The bonuses are paid following approval of the financial statements for the year to
which they relate. To involve senior executives more closely in the growth and development of Schneider
Electric's business, their variable bonuses represent a greater proportion of their total remuneration
package than is the practice among other industrial groups. Executive Committee members and
corporate officers also benefit from stock option plans.
Executive compensation in 2001
In 2001, Group companies paid a total of E8.0 million to members of the Executive Committee, of which
E3.4 million in variable bonuses. This includes the Executive Committee members' fixed salaries and
benefits for 2001 and their variable bonuses for 2000, paid in 2001. The variable bonus was based on
three corporate financial criteria, as well as on quantitative and qualitative targets related to the unit
headed by the executive concerned.
The corporate financial criteria were as follows:
Growth in earnings per share, which amounted to 26.9% in 2000.
-Sales growth, which came to 6.9% in 2000 excluding the currency effect and after removing companies
acquired after January 1, 2000 from the 2000 reference figure.
-.The performance of the Schneider Electric share in relation to a benchmark index of European industrial
stocks. In 2000, the share underperformed the index by 0.09%.
The total covers all members of the Executive Committee for the period during which they were members.
One member resigned on January 19, 2001 and Jean-Paul Jacamon resigned on October 19, 2001.
Remuneration of corporate officers in 2001
Total remuneration, including attendance fees:
Henri Lachmann Amounts paid in 2001
- Fixed salary and benefits: E735,600
- Attendance fees: E53,700
- Variable bonuses for 2000 and 1999: E947,600
Jean-Paul Jacamon Amounts paid in 2001
- Fixed salary and benefits: E386,400
- Attendance fees: E30,700





Stock option plans are approved by the Board of Directors following a review of the plans by the
Remunerations and Appointments Committee. Plan number 19 was decided as part of the annual policy
to grant stock options. The 1,050 grantees included the 250 members of senior management, 100 high
potential executives and 700 employees who performed exceptionally well. The number of options
granted to a given grantee depended on his or her position within the organization and his or her personal
performance. Plan number 20, which covers 180 people, is designed to motivate the Company's senior
managers to meet targets set out in the NEW 2004 program.
Description
The exercise price is equal to the average share price prior to the date of grant by the Board of Directors.
No discount is applied. The options have an eight year life. Options granted under plans 12 through 19
may be exercised as from the fourth year, as long as the grantee holds the shares subscribed or acquired
in registered form until the end of a five-year period following the date of grant. In certain cases, however,
the options may be exercised without condition as from the third year. Options granted under plan 20 may
be exercised without condition as from the fourth year or, in certain cases, as from the third year.
Options granted under plans 11, 12, 14 through 18 and plan 20 may be exercised provided that specific
targets are met concerning income, value creation or sales. Because these targets were only partially
achieved, 1,320,219 options granted under plans 15, 16 and 17 were cancelled in 2001.
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Outstanding options
(at Eceanber 31. 2001)
Pan Dat Date Type utrrr Options Optis Options Number of Nunber Starting Expiration Price
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Options granted to and exercised by corporate officers and the top grantees during the year
Options granted during Plan 19 Pla 20
the year to
corporate officers Number Exercise Number Exercice
of options price Expires of options price Expires
Henri Lachrnann 168,000 68.8 2010 100,000 51.76 2010
Jean-Paul Jacamon 37,,50 68,8 2010




olficers of options Number of Exercise Number of Exercise Number of Exercise Number of Exercise
exercised options price options price options price options price
Henri Lachmann - -
Jean-Paul Jacanion 41,320 5,600 24.92 8,200 24.92 7.520 35.37 20,00® 35,67
Options granted to Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 19 Plan 20
and exercised by the
top ten employee Total Avg. Number Number Number Number
grantees during number of weighted of options of options of options of options
the year options granted price exercised exercised granted granted
Granted 514,400 56.88 166,800 .343,600





"Resolutions voted on in Annual Shareholders' Meeting
The Board of Directors may award exceptional compensation to Directors for the performance of specific
tasks or for their membership on committees of the Board. Any such compensation shall be included in
the Company's operating expenses and shall be submitted to the Ordinary General Meeting of
shareholders for approval in accordance with the law."
"The Board of Directors shall determine the compensation of the Chief Executive Officer and his or her
term of office, which may not exceed either the period for which the decision has been made to separate
the functions of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer or his or her term as Director, where applicable."
""On the recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer, the Board of Directors may appoint one or
several individuals to assist the Chief Executive Officer. These individuals shall have the title of Chief
Operating Officer. The Board of Directors shall determine jointly with the Chief Executive Officer the terms
of office and the powers of the Chief Operating Officers. The Board of Directors shall determine the
compensation paid to the Chief Operating Officers.
Schneider Electric Disclosure Score
Type of Compensation Disclosure: Schneider Electric explicitly discloses its fixed and variable
compensation as well as stock and option grants (SalaryDisclosure = 1 and StockDisclosure = 1).
Amount of Compensation Disclosure: Schneider Electric discloses compensation to the top
two executives as well as the total amount of compensation to the executive committee
(AmountDisclosure = 2).
Quality of Compensation Disclosure: The compensation disclosure in the annual report
includes discussions about (i) overall compensation policy and goals, (ii) pay-setting guidelines
for specific positions, (iii) executive compensation in previous years, and (iv) future
determinants of executive compensation (QualityDisclosure = 2).
Disclosure, which is the sum of SalaryDisclosure, StockDisclosure, AmountDisclosure,
and QualityDisclosure, is 6.
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